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Practice Section. Copies are available by w riting to the offices o f the Public Oversight Board.

Litigation—A Crisis and An Opportunity

the principal ones are these. The first is the alleged failure of gener
ally accepted accounting principles to provide financial statements
that understandably and realistically present financial condition,
results of operations, and the probability of continuing viability for
the reporting company. The failure of accountants to communicate
clearly to the general public the nature and extent of assurance an
audit can provide to readers of financial statements is the other, and
particularly the limited extent of that assurance about some asser
tions imbedded in financial statements. Independent accountants do
sometimes fail to perform their audit function in an exemplary man
ner. Far more often, however, they are accused and held responsible
for events and conditions beyond their ability to foresee or forestall.
We believe the task of restoring public confidence in the profes
sion and its willingness to face its responsibilities requires that the
profession find a means of going beyond what the SEC Practice
Section’s Quality Control Inquiry Committee presently does—
inquire whether litigation against a firm indicates a quality control
problem. The purpose of such expanded inquiry would be to accumu
late knowledge which would permit the refinement of accounting
principles and auditing standards in the light of hard experience;
and also to provide guidance to all practitioners about risks that they
should address in planning and performing audits. This must be done
without jeopardizing the litigation posture of firms charged with
audit failures. To do so will require imagination and courage. We are
confident means can be found to do it.
The accounting profession’s present self-regulatory program has
already had a profound and exemplary impact on the quality of inde
pendent auditing in this country. We are confident that program can
be strengthened further. The profession has been remarkably respon
sive to suggestions for its improvement, and we are confident that it
will accept suggestions for further improvement if these are realistic.
In the near future, we expect to propose to the leadership of the
profession, regulators, and legislators measures that we think will
strengthen both the quality of audit performance and the reality of
auditor responsibility. In return we hope and expect that the present
unfair and unconscionable burdens of class action litigation against
accountants should be mitigated materially.
Our chairman, Mr. A. A. Sommer, Jr., recently offered a sugges
tion for a possible course of action for the Board and the profession
in a speech to the American Accounting Association on “ The Chal
lenge of Accountability.’ ’ A portion of Mr. Sommer’s remarks are
included in the POB Commentary on the Accounting Profession
section of this report.

In the estimation of the leadership of the accounting profession, the
present flood of litigation assailing accounting firms and the multi
million dollar judgments and settlements resulting constitute a grave
danger to the continued viability of the accounting profession as it
presently exists and to its ability to perform its vital function of
providing assurances of the integrity of financial information relied
upon by investors and creditors.
While the Public Oversight Board’s most immediate responsibil
ity is oversight of the programs of the SEC Practice Section of the
AICPA’s Division for CPA firms, it believes—and has repeatedly
said—that it cannot be indifferent to any situation or occurrence
that may adversely affect the integrity, the utility and the reliability
of the audit function or the ability of members of the accounting
profession to perform that function.
In the face of the concerns of the profession, and our own
perception of the significance of the litigation against accounting
firms, the Board determined it cannot be a mere spectator, but must
assess this problem in the light of the public interest. The Board’s
responsibility is to the public; that responsibility cannot be sepa
rated from concern with the fate of the accounting profession and its
ability to continue to provide quality audit services.
Thus, the Board has carefully studied the accounting profes
sion’s litigation problem to determine whether it may adversely af
fect the public interest. To complete its study, members of the Board
and its full-time staff met for two days in a setting that permitted an
uninterrupted examination of the accounting profession’s liability
concerns in the context of its current and prospective performance
of the audit function. Members of our staff, whose professional
backgrounds and continuing oversight activities uniquely equip
them to do so, spent considerable time in developing an appropriate
agenda. To reduce the possibility of overlooking important matters,
we invited thoughtful and provocative thinkers who share our con
cerns about the accounting profession but who approach them from
various backgrounds and positions to provide us with suggestions
about the matters that should be discussed. We are deeply indebted
to them for sharing their insights and their experience with the
Board and staff.
The Board concluded that the public interest is adversely af
fected by the present litigation threat confronting the profession.
The reasons for this conclusion will be set forth in detail in a special
report which the Board expects to publish early in 1993. In brief,
these include the problems which would flow from the failure of a
major firm; the impact of litigation on recruitment and retention of
trained and competent personnel; the unwillingness of firms to as
sume responsibility for the audit of smaller firms and firms in their
early stages which pose greater risks of failure; the hesitancy of
the accounting profession to assume new responsibilities because of
litigation fears; and the possibility that firms may eventually be un
willing to give the assurances they have traditionally provided to
American industry, its investors and its creditors.
However, the Board concluded that the litigation problem
cannot be considered apart from the widespread feeling in many
quarters that independent auditors as a group have not met either
their audit responsibilities or the expectations of investors and
creditors as fully as they should. Concurrently with efforts to secure
legislation that will sensibly limit the exposure of the profession to
liabilities that exceed the extent of their responsibilities, we believe
the profession must also address these beliefs concerning the ade
quacy of auditor performance.
As we have studied this public concern, it appears it may stem
from a number of circumstances. For the moment, it appears to us

About the SECPS and the POB
The SEC Practice Section (SECPS) imposes membership require
ments and administers two fundamental programs to ensure that
SEC registrants are audited by accounting firms with adequate qual
ity control systems: (1) peer review, through which Section members
have their practices reviewed every three years by other accoun
tants, and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allegations of
audit failure involving a publicly-held entity contained in litigation
filed against member firms to determine if the firms’ quality control
systems require corrective measures.
The Public Oversight Board (POB) is an autonomous body con
sisting of five members with a broad spectrum of business, profes
sional, regulatory and legislative experience that oversees the
SECPS activities. The Board’s primary responsibility is to safeguard
the public interest (1) when the SECPS sets, revises and enforces
standards, membership requirements, rules and procedures, and (2)
when the Section’s committees consider the results of individual
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peer reviews and the possible implications of litigation alleging audit
failure. As mentioned earlier, the Board believes its responsibilities
also include the monitoring of all matters and developments which
may affect the integrity of the audit process and, where appropriate,
remarking upon them. To preserve its independence, the Board
appoints its own members, chairman and staff, sets its own compen
sation, and establishes its own operating procedures.

Our second concern is that COSO’s guidance in both its February
draft and its final report on reporting to external parties about the
quality of an entity’s internal controls will likely result in “ boiler
plate” assurances being provided as only the existence of material
weaknesses need be reported. The occurrence of material weak
nesses are relatively infrequent and the material weakness concept
does not apply to some of the components of internal control identi
fied in the COSO report. The Board believes that when significant
weaknesses exist, as they often do, below the material weakness
threshold in any component of internal control their existence
should be acknowledged in a report to external parties.
To maintain the comprehensiveness of its oversight activities in
the face of a record number of SECPS peer reviews, the majority of
which were initial reviews of firms which joined pursuant to the
1990 AICPA bylaw change mandating membership in the SECPS for
all firms in the AICPA that audit SEC clients, the Board trained and
supervised seven retired partners from SECPS member firms, who
assisted the four permanent staff members in the oversight of the
1991 peer review program. The part-time staff reside in geographic
regions with high densities of member firms, which helped to mini
mize the costs associated with oversight of the program. The Board
continues to use part-time staff in 1992.
It is the Board’s opinion, based on its intensive oversight, that
the SECPS self-regulatory program contributes significantly to the
quality of auditing in the U .S., particularly the quality of public
company audits. The Board is pleased that the SEC shares this view.
The POB is proud to report that this year’s recipient of the John
J. McCloy Award for Outstanding Contributions to Audit Excellence
was Ms. Barbara Franklin, who is currently the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce. The presentation was made in January before she as
sumed her present office in recognition of her outstanding contribu
tions to the improvement of audit quality in this country. She has
served as a director of several major U.S. corporations, regularly
serving on their audit committees and frequently as chairperson of
the committee. In addition, Ms. Franklin contributed to the en
hancement of audit quality through her service as a member of the
AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board Planning Committee, as a public
member of the AICPA’s Board of Directors, and as chairperson of its
audit committee.

Board Activities
The Board maintains active relationships with organizations that
scrutinize the profession, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the General Accounting Office, the Auditing Standards
Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. In its deliber
ations, the Board carefully considers all comments, reports and pro
posals that these bodies and authorities publish which may affect
the profession.
Altogether, the Board met seven times this year. In connection
with these meetings, the Board met with the Comptroller-General of
the U.S., the Chief Accountant of the SEC, the President of the
Financial Accounting Foundation, the general counsels of two of the
largest SECPS member firms, the Planning Committee of the SECPS,
and the Chairman, President and other officials of the AICPA. The
Board also held three “ outreach programs” at which it met with
leaders of large and small SECPS member firms who are members of
the Wisconsin, California, and Pennsylvania societies of CPAs. All
these discussions helped shape the Board’s views on a number of
topics relating to the SECPS self-regulatory programs as well as
other matters relating to audit quality.
Scope o f POB Oversight o f 1991 Peer Reviews by
Number o f SEC Registrants Audited by Reviewed Firm
Visitation and

Workpaper

Report

Workpaper Review

Review

Review

Oversight o f the Peer Review Process

Total Visitation
and Workpaper Review

Total
Workpaper Review

Total
Report Review

Total
All Firms

113

183

78

374

Because the Board believes the peer review process is the foundation
for the Section’s self-regulatory program, it monitors that process
closely. The Board and its staff closely monitor not only the perform
ance of the Peer Review Committee in setting standards and process
ing reports, but also the performance of independent peer review
teams as they comprehensively review the appropriateness of the
quality control systems of member firms and compliance by the
firms’ personnel with stated policies and procedures.

Last year the Board provided extensive suggestions to the Com
mittee on Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) on its initial exposure draft “ Internal Control-Integrated
Framework.” In April 1992, representatives of the Board met with
representatives of COSO to express two continuing concerns the
Board has with the February 1992 revised draft report exposed for
public comment. First, the February draft seems to exempt small
public companies from the need to have audit committees as a part of
their corporate governance structure. Our research of Quality Con
trol Inquiry Committee cases suggests that there is a higher inci
dence of fraudulent financial reporting among smaller public compa
nies which suggests that these entities would benefit from improved
corporate governance provided by independent directors overseeing
the financial reporting process. The final report of COSO issued in
September 1992 has been revised to point out the critical importance
of independent directors in overseeing the financial reporting pro
cess of smaller and mid-size public entities.

One or more Board members and staff members of the Board
attended the meetings of the Peer Review Committee. The Peer
Review Committee evaluates each report to determine whether the
review team appropriately applied peer review standards. Each eval
uation is based in part on the review, conducted by the committee’s
staff members, of some or all of the review team ’s workpapers and
reports. In addition, the Board actively monitors the committee’s
follow-up of corrective actions.

Peer Review Oversight Activities
The Board’s oversight of the peer review process involves staff re
view of every peer review performed by the Section, pursuant to one
of the POB’s three oversight programs. These programs, which are
designed to evaluate whether the reviews were properly done in
compliance with peer review performance and reporting standards,
are as follows:
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V isitation a n d W orkpaper R eview Program . This involves
observation of the performance of field work, attendance at the
exit conference during which the review team reports its findings
and recommendations to the management of the reviewed firm,
and review of the review team ’s workpapers and reports and the
reviewed firm ’s response.

11/ 1 /1 979

Results o f Q C IC A c tiv ity

7 /1 /1 9 9 1

th roug h

thro u g h

6 /3 0 /1 9 9 1

6 /3 0 /1 9 9 2

Totals

Actions Related to Firms:

W orkpaper R eview Program . This consists of the review of the
review team’s workpapers and reports and the firm’s response.
R eport R eview P ro g ram . This entails review of selected portions

of the review team ’s workpapers, its reports, and the firm ’s
response.
The SEC, through the office of its Chief Accountant, oversees
the peer review process and POB oversight of the process. The
SEC’s inspection of the 1991 peer reviews is substantially complete,
and the Board expects the SEC to again endorse the process in its
annual report.

Either a special review was made,
the firm's regularly scheduledpeer
review or inspection was expanded, or
other relevant work was inspected........

..45

7

52

A firm took appropriate corrective
measures that were responsive to
the implications o f the
specific case ......................................

..61

10

71

..39

1

40

.. 16

4

20

161

22

183

Actions Related to Standards
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies
were asked to consider the need for
changes in, or guidance on, professional
standards. .........................................

Commentary on Peer Review

Actions Related to Individuals
The case referred to the AICPA
Professional Ethics Division with a
recommendation for investigation into
work o f specific individuals..................

During the 1991-92 year, 300 firms had their initial peer review.
These peer reviews resulted in a 25% rate of qualified or adverse
reports and the finding that over 5 % of peer reviewed audit engage
ments were seriously flawed. Consequently, the firms involved were
required to undertake substantial corrective measures to improve
their quality of practice and eliminate the deficiencies on the flawed
engagements. Since the inception of the peer review program in
1977, firms undergoing reviews subsequent to their initial review
have had a 7% rate of qualified and adverse reports and a percentage
of flawed engagements approximating 1% . The high rate of qualified
or adverse reports for first time reviews indicates clearly the wisdom
of the AICPA in requiring that all firms with AICPA members which
audit publicly-held companies must join the SECPS. The contrast
with the number of qualified or adverse reports and flawed engage
ments resulting from subsequent reviews indicates plainly the reme
dial benefits of the peer review program.
The Board identified two areas of concern in its 1990-91 annual
report: the length of time taken to process certain reviews and
the clarity of peer review letters of comments in communicating
review findings.
The Board’s staff worked closely with the Peer Review Committee
and its staff in developing a system to identify, on a timely basis, those
peer reviews with issues that may be difficult to resolve. This year in
those cases, active intervention by committee members resulted in
more timely resolution of problems and the identification of corrective
actions. Unfortunately, the system employed by the committee and its
staff to monitor whether these firms had timely taken the required
actions was not as effective. We urge the committee to implement a
more effective monitoring system to avoid the possibility of delay by
firms in taking required corrective action in the future.
The Peer Review Committee has formed a task force to consider
the Board’s concerns about the clarity of letters of comments. Sev
eral meetings attended by the Board’s staff have been held. The
Board urges that reconsideration of the standards for preparing
letters of comments be completed expeditiously.

Total

(Note: Frequently m ore than one action is taken by the QCIC o r by the firm .)

litigation to determine whether professional standards, quality
control standards, or the Section’s membership requirements need
revision or whether additional guidance is needed.
The Board monitors the activities of the QCIC and has unre
stricted access to the committee’s files as well as to all meetings of
the committee and its task forces. The Board’s staff reads the com
plaint, pertinent financial statements, other public documents, and
relevant professional literature for each reported case. During the
1991-92 year, all QCIC meetings were attended by one or more Board
members and staff. Additionally, the Board’s staff actively partici
pated in virtually all of the forty QCIC task force meetings with
representatives of the firms reporting litigation. The Board receives
reports from its staff on the activity concerning each case to evaluate
whether the QCIC properly fulfills its responsibilities. Based on these
activities, the Board believes that appropriate consideration was
given to the 41 cases closed this year, and that the QCIC adequately
complements the peer review process.
The SEC also oversees the QCIC process and the POB oversight of
it. For each closed case, the SEC is provided with a “ closed case
summary” which describes the allegations and the quality control
implications thereof and the actions taken by the QCIC to ascertain
whether there are shortcomings in the firm’s quality controls or
compliance therewith. In addition, the SEC is provided with the
POB’s oversight program and the POB and QCIC staff meet with the
staff of the Office of the Chief Accountant to provide further infor
mation if necessary to indicate the basis for QCIC’s conclusions
concerning the adequacy of quality controls. While SEC staff review
of cases closed in 1991-92 has not yet been completed, preliminary
indications are that the SEC continues to be satisfied with the QCIC
process as a complement to the peer review process.

Oversight o f the Quality Control Inquiry Process
The quality control inquiry process supplements the peer review
process. It is administered by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee
(QCIC), which reviews all litigation and government proceedings
that allege a firm did not perform an audit of a publicly-held com
pany in accordance with professional standards. A copy of each
complaint alleging such substandard performance by a member firm
is required to be reported to the QCIC. The QCIC’s task is to deter
mine whether the allegations indicate possible deficiencies in the
firm’s quality controls. In addition, the QCIC’s job is to analyze such

Commentary on the QCIC
At the end of last year, the Board had identified several initiatives to
improve the effectiveness of QCIC activities and had communicated
these to the QCIC chairman. In particular, the Board recommended
that prior to meeting with representatives of a firm reporting litiga
tion, the QCIC staff should obtain sufficient data about the firm ’s
quality controls and the environment in which the allegedly faulty
audit was conducted to enable the committee to conduct its inquiry
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more efficiently and effectively. The Board also urged the QCIC to
more frequently inspect selected audit workpaper documentation to
corroborate firm representations and to review firm guidance in
areas relating to the allegations rather than rely on general descrip
tions of it. The QCIC activity in 1991-92 reflected implementation of
these recommendations.
During the year, the QCIC increased its access to the workpapers
of contested engagements by reviewing portions of the workpapers
relating to eight allegedly faulty audits. Additionally, for five other
engagements QCIC task forces met with engagement supervisory
personnel to obtain a firsthand understanding of the audit environ
ment in which the audit was performed and the extent to which the
audit plan responded to it. These investigatory procedures increase

the effectiveness of the QCIC process. The Board urges the commit
tee to continue this trend.
In the year ended June 30, 1991, the QCIC formulated a policy
that requires the review, in certain circumstances, of other engage
ments performed by individuals who supervised the allegedly faulty
audit to determine if any corrective action is needed to improve
compliance with or design of quality controls. In four instances,
cases were closed in the current year based in part on knowledge the
QCIC obtained on screening documentation of the findings of re
cently completed internal reviews. However, the QCIC did not par
ticipate in the planning or the conduct of any of these internal
reviews. To be most effective, the Board believes the committee
should have such involvement.

POB Commentary on the Accounting Profession
While the POB's form al charter is to oversee the activities o f the SECPS, the Board also recognizes its responsibility to m onitor and, when appropriate, to comment
on m atters that may a ffe ct the in te g rity o f the audit process and the credibility o f financial statements. The Board believes it would ill serve the public interest i f
the quality control process were a m odel o f efficiency and in te g rity w hile other forces and circumstances destroyed the profession's or the public's confidence in it.
Hence, we feel constrained to include in this report the follow ing comments.

can justly be proud, however, must not breed a complacency
or satisfaction.

The liability crisis that now threatens the survival of the accounting
profession as we know it carries with it equally ominous concerns
about its effects on the future reliability of financial reporting and
capital formation. The following portions of a recent speech by our
Chairman A. A. Sommer, J r ., delivered at the annual meeting of the
American Accounting Association, addresses these concerns in the
context of a tentative proposal the POB is presently researching,
along with many others, in its reevaluation of the effectiveness of
the profession’s self-regulatory programs. As mentioned earlier, the
POB will issue a special report early next year that will not only
address the liability crisis, but will also include the results of its
research and specific recommendations about regulation of the ac
counting profession and other means to improve the attest function.

The safety statistics of the airline industry are even more
impressive and one of the reasons may be the way in which
failures in that industry are dealt with. When there is a crash
there is a painstaking investigation of the tragedy by the National
Transportation Safety Board. The findings and conclusions of the
Board are not admissible in any proceeding, thus the Board is not
inhibited by the airlines’ liability concerns from studying the
evidence and publishing a report. And often significant new safe
guards are mandated as a result of these reports: no smoking in
lavatories, improved deicing procedures, indicator lights in the
aisles - all these safety measures were the results of such investi
gations. The extremely low incidence of failure does not make
the typical airline executive depart a whit from his or her com
mitment to z e ro failures.

The present litigation crisis in the profession is, in the eyes of
many, life-threatening to one or more of the major firms; it has
already contributed heavily to the demise of one of the larger
firms, leaving innumerable human tragedies in its wake. God
willing that will not be the fate of the thousands who depend
upon any one of the major firms. The POB has at a recent ex
tended meeting determined it will lend its support to the effort to
secure the enactment of legislation that will restore the balance
between accountability and liability because it believes that is
fair and because we believe it is in the public interest.

I think that if the profession is able to secure legislative relief
from the laws that today make its members often accountable for
wrongs they did not commit and if it were able to secure appropri
ate legislation, similar to that governing the NTSB, barring the
introduction of the report in any proceeding, it should, within the
structure of the SEC Practice Section, consider amending the char
ter of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee, which presently
limits that body’s inquiry to whether the allegations in cases re
ported suggest a flaw in the accused firm’s quality controls or
compliance with them, or a fault in the profession’s standards, to
permit inquiry into whether indeed there was a failed audit, and if
there was, the reasons for it. Thus, like the National Transporta
tion Safety Board, skilled and experienced auditors and insightful
academics would examine the records of the firm to determine
whether the allegations reported to the QCIC indicate there may
have been a faulty audit, if so what caused it, what measures
should be taken by the profession to avoid a recurrence, how
similar problems can be avoided in the future. The entire airline
industry learns from the NTSB inquiries; the entire accounting
profession could learn from a similar inquiry into audit failures.

The Board has taken this position in part because of the very
topic we are focussing upon - accountability. The Board, and I
believe all of us, believe that a person, a body, an entity should be
accountable for its conduct; by the same token, it should not be
accountable for someone else’s conduct. The fault in our litiga
tion system today as it affects auditors is that too often they are
held accountable for someone else’s failures and shortcomings
and accountability faults. Auditors, as I have indicated earlier,
should be accountable for the harm caused when they fail to meet
their responsibilities, but they should not be accountable for the
frauds, the failures, the shortcomings of others, and for, yes, the
failures of government policies.
However, I have a further concern that I think is shared by
the other members of the Board. That is that the present crisis
has so dominated the thinking of leaders of the profession that it
has left no time, no energy, no desire to think beyond the present
legislative agenda and tackle the other rough problems that con
front the profession. I mentioned a moment ago the very small
number of failed audits. That statistic, of which the profession

This will strike many as a radical proposal. The accounting
profession today, sadly, is litigation driven. Any proposal looking
toward reform is viewed with suspicion by the firms and their
counsel - and as a lawyer, I can certainly understand their con
servatism and their concern. It may be that to achieve the objec
tive of such an inquiry without unduly burdening the firms this
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proposal would need to be refined. The Board stands ready to
discuss those refinements. But I urge the firms and their counsel
to understand how imperative it is that the profession, notwith
standing the urgency and reality of the litigation crisis, see this
proposal as a powerful means of identifying the problems which
are creating the present crisis of confidence the profession is
experiencing and remedying them.
There is so much to be considered, so much to be done. Gene
Freedman, the head of Coopers and Lybrand, was quoted as saying
the accounting profession must accept the fact that it must accept
more responsibility. That is true. Like it or not, auditors are going
to be more responsible for opining on internal controls; they are
going to be called upon to be more vigorous in pursuing fraud; they
are going to be under a stronger mandate to see to it that hanky-

panky is not hidden or concealed. They are going to accept some
measure of mark-to-market accounting or have it shoved down
their throats. And they must examine with the rigor of a skilled
pathologist what has brought on the present crisis. Is it accounting
principles? Is it audit procedures? Is it timidity in the face of de
manding clients? Is it excessive competition? Is it the erosion of
professionalism? Is it the historic form in which financial state
ments and the opinions on them are cast? Is it the increased com
plexity of financial transactions? Is it difficulty in training people to
deal with this complexity? These questions cry out for answers. In
finding those answers all of you can, through research and dia
logue among yourselves, make enormous contributions, and I urge
you most strongly to renew and reinvigorate your efforts to find
those answers.

M em bers o f th e P ublic O versig h t B oard
Robert K. Mautz,
Vice Chairman, 1987-present; joined
Board in 1981; Partner, Ernst &
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